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Vertreter einer einflußreichen Argumentationsrichtung in der neueren Forschung
über die industrielle Reorganisation in modernen Industriegesellschaften sehen im
Aufbau zwischenbetrieblicher Vertrauensstrukturen und im "relational contracting"
mögliche Wege, die betriebliche Organisation an die vom Markt geforderte Flexibilität
anzupassen (Sabel, Gambetta).
Über die zwischenbetrieblichen Beziehungen in Frankreich besteht traditionell die
Vorstellung, daß es für große Unternehmen und ihre Zulieferer sehr schwer ist, auf
Vertrauen basierende Netzwerke aufzubauen. Unterdessen ist das Verhältnis jedoch
von Sub-Contracting geprägt: Die großen Unternehmen geben spezifizierte
Informationen über die von ihnen geforderten Leistungen, welche die
Subunternehmer detailgetreu auszuführen haben. Berichte und Veröffentlichungen
der letzten Jahre deuten darauf hin, daß sich das distanzierte Verhältnis der großen
Unternehmen und ihrer Zulieferer zunehmend in eine "Vertrauens"-beziehung
wandelt. Dieser Arbeit liegt die These zugrunde, daß die Beziehungen zwischen
Zulieferern und großen Unternehmen zwar gewaltige Veränderungen erfahren, daß
die Kategorie "Vertrauen" allerdings das Wesen dieser Veränderungen nicht
hinreichend erfassen kann. Die großen Unternehmen haben Macht und Einfluß auf
dem Markt und politische Ressourcen auf ihrer Seite, was sie in eine starke Position
gegenüber ihren Zulieferern versetzt. Bei diesem nach wie vor asymmetrischen
Kräfteverhältnis bleiben die großen Unternehmen nach wie vor die stärkeren Partner.
Abstract
An influential position in the contemporary study of industrial reorganisation
discusses the construction of "inter-firm trust" or "relational contracting" as ways to
adjust the organisation of firms to the flexibility required by the market. The
conventional picture of the relation between large firms in France and small firms
who supply them, suggests that it is very hard for them to construct such trust-based
networks. Instead, it is one of atomised sub-contracting: the large firm gives very
detailed specifications for the job that needs to be done, and the subcontractor
executes. In recent years, however, several accounts have suggested that this arms-
length relationship between larger firms and suppliers is changing.
The argument of this paper is that, while the relationships between suppliers and
large firms are indeed undergoing tremendous changes, the category of trust does
not appear to capture the nature of these changes very well. The combined use of
their market power and the political resources that large firms have at their disposal,
allow them to remain the stronger partner in what always was an asymmetric power
relationship. The argument is supported by detailed discussions of just-in-time
delivery, quality issues and the role of the large firms in organizing small firm finance.Table of contents page
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Introduction
The changing terms of world competition are raising the pressures on firms to
adjust rapidly to volatile market conditions. An influential position in the
contemporary study of industrial reorganisation discusses the construction of inter-
firm trust“ or "relational contracting“ as ways to adjust the organisation of firms to
the flexibility required by the market. The idea at the basis of this argument is that
large firms need to open up and become the aggregate expression of a series of
decentralised production units and develop links with the firms that supply them with
parts, goods and services. The end result is that an industrial network emerges,
organised concentrically around the producer of final goods, in which all participants
share local knowledge. This new, flexible and relatively loose structure is frequently
portrayed as one of the core recipes for economic success in the new world after
the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.
France is an interesting place to study this type of innovative organisational models.
The conventional picture of the relation between large firms in France and small
firms who supply them is one of atomised sub-contracting: the large firm gives very
detailed specifications for the job that needs to be done, and the subcontractor
executes: inter-firm Taylorism, one influential research report in the mid-1980s
called this situation. It is —unsurprisingly— very similar to the relationship between
workers and management, which relies on detailed instructions from superiors, and
workers’ tasks are limited to those instructions. Both pictures are so similar because
essentially the same mechanism is at the basis: lack of trust.
i
In recent years, however, several accounts have suggested that this arms-length
relationship between larger firms and suppliers is changing, alongside, and perhaps
propelled by, changes in the relations between workers and shopfloor
management.
ii The recent literature on French industry in effect abounds with
discussions of the development of trust between large and small firms,
iii the creation
of partnership relationships between suppliers and final producers,
iv and even the
emergence of industrial districts.
v Most of these accounts agree that these changes
are the consequences of the search for increased competitiveness which followed
the French economy’s relative opening up to the international economy since the
early 1970s.
The main purpose of this paper is to systematize some important elements in that
debate in light of both this new literature and field research on industrial
reorganization in France between 1993-95.
vi The argument this paper attempts to
make is that, while the relationships between suppliers and large firms are indeed
undergoing tremendous changes and that there is little doubt that these changes2
reflect the pattern of industrial reorganisation in France and contribute to the
general economic performance of France, in many ways, the category of trust does
not appear to capture these changes very well. The combined use of their market
power and the political resources that large firms have at their disposal, allow them
to remain the stronger partner in what always was an asymmetric power
relationship. Because of the dual nature of the new ties, the way the large firms are
reorganizing their relationships with small firms seems best captured in words
ascribed to Lenin: “trust is good, control is better.”
vii
The remainder of the paper consists of five parts. Section 1 locates the paper in the
wider debate on political-economic adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, and
discusses the general theoretical points regarding inter-firm relationships. The
empirical sections which follow, deal with three areas of change: new patterns of
sub-contracting (sec.2), issues of quality control (sec.3) and the role of large firms in
financing their suppliers (sec.4).
viii The fifth and final section summarises and
concludes.
1. The politics of industrial change: large and small firms in France
There are essentially two views on SMEs in France: institutionalist and relational
contract-based. For the first one, they are weak, underfinanced and atomised firms,
kept alive solely by the goodwill of the state to protect and subsidise them.
Paradigmatic examples of this view are the companies where the combination of
isolation with poorly designed government policies towards them, has weakened
and isolated them even further. Typically, for example, these cases are found in the
machine-tool industry, who have very few large firms among their clients, and textile
firms, directly inserted into product markets where they are, except for a very small
number, incapable of competing with low-wage countries. As a result, the sectors
vanished in France and gradually relocated in other countries.
The intellectual roots of this view are found in a large body of literature on the
French political economy, which emphasises its path-dependent development.
Because of the historical evolution of France’s institutions, all parties involved in
industrial change are simultaneously incapable of imposing their own view of
industrial society yet capable of blocking any changes that impinge on their
interests. Hence the need for a strong state to step in and guide the actors on the
correct path of adjustment. The consequence of this reliance upon central authority
was the weak development of the social actors themselves, and therefore of their
possibilities to adjust to the imperatives of the post-1970s world.3
The second view, which is considerably more open to the possibility of change,
discerns within the French context a process that is very similar to what is going on
in other OECD-countries. In response to the changing international economic
context, firms are gradually revising their ways of doing things, mutually open up,
and, as a consequence, blur the boundaries between them. The basic mechanism
for this change is trust: the expectation that, because of the mutual dependencies,
no firm is able to hold up the other, and all combine their resources in order to find
their way into the new world. The intellectual ancestors of this view are game theory
and the new economics of organisation, combined with new, more discursive
strands in current political economy. The typical cases are the companies which, in
one way or another, are integrated into larger collaborative networks, usually as
suppliers to large firms who have redefined their relationships with their suppliers.
The analysis of the relations between large firms and their suppliers which follows,
suggests that neither of these two positions on French SMEs wholly captures the
phenomenon. The historical-institutional view, which emphasises the structural
impossibility of SMEs to break out of the counterproductive dependencies, is
fundamentally incorrect. The self-organising capacities of French industry
(sometimes with help from the state) have created an industrial landscape which is,
in most relevant respects, the opposite of what the historical-institutional views
predict: there are strong relational links between large firms and their suppliers,
universally certified quality standards allow suppliers to compete internationally as
well as domestically, and the companies are organised around extremely complex
just-in-time delivery networks. However, the other interpretation, which relies
precisely on these new elements and characterises them as foreboding new types
of organisations, runs up against empirical limits as well. French firms simply never
moved toward the model of institutionally embedded trust associated with the
industrial districts in Italy and Germany: as I will discuss in great detail later on,
large firms continue to hold extremely tight reins on their suppliers.
France can, on the basis of these data, alternatively, be interpreted as the first
European country to converge on Japanese “best practice,” forced in many regards
to do so by the particular historical development of its social and political
institutions. As in Japan, large firms are at the core of the production network,
suppliers are technically, organisationally and financially integrated into this
network, and the standard production model is “flexible mass production,” i.e. lightly
customised products of high quality (Piore 1994; Regini 1995 discuss this). All these
elements are typical of the inter-firm relationships in the Japanese keiretsu.
However, compared to the ideal-typical situation in Japan, large firms in France
have considerably more control over their suppliers, and both parties in the
contracting relationship regularly reaffirm their independence from one another,
which can eventually lead to a breakdown in the relationship (i.e. non-renewal of the
contract). Since large firms and their suppliers share almost no joint product
development responsibility, the price that the large firms pays for a breakdown is, in4
contrast to what is the case in the Japanese model, in which the supplier is in a
position to hold up the large firm, a relatively inexpensive act for the buyer.
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Because of these differences, it would be incorrect to see French industry as
copying other models —even though that was often the stated goal. Instead, French
industry appears to have found its own, “unique” way out of the crisis of the 1970s.
Instead of copying or transferring institutions from Germany or Japan in order to
catch up, French industry found a series of functional equivalents to the German or
Japanese solutions to the problems of advanced capitalism.
A short theoretical exposition will clarify what is meant here. Recent work in political
economy, following in large part from a combination of historical institutionalism and
game theory, sees firms not any longer as the black boxes they are to conventional
economic theory, but as a combination of problematic relationships, in which they
are engaged simultaneously: with customers (i.e. on markets), with owners (i.e. via
banks or equity markets), with workers (via training systems and labour relations),
and with other firms (as suppliers of capital goods, parts or services)
x. The claim
regarding these four relationships is that choices in one inevitably has
consequences for the other: bank financing in Germany, for example, implies
longer-term product market horizons, which allows for adjustments where cost-
cutting is of relatively secondary importance; that, in turn, makes labour relations
both more open and more peaceful. Conversely, well-developed training systems
and stable labour relations make quality-oriented product market strategies possible
since they provide the highly-skilled workers necessary for such an adjustment.
Because national institutions provide differential sets of incentives and constraints
for the solution of these functional problems, firms in different countries will
tendentially follow different paths of adjustment when faced with similar problems.
Adjustment paths should therefore be seen as “systems,” in which changes in one
of the relationships either propels changes in another or, inversely, where the
“systemic drag” is too strong for intentional change is one of these composite
relationships to succeed.
It is therefore extremely difficult, both theoretically and empirically to simply
“reinvent”, construct or copy a national model. Attempts at reorganising workers’
participation in the firm on a German-style footing in the early 1980s, for example,
not only miserably failed in their stated goals, but ended up decimating the very
labour unions they were meant to empower.
xi Financial deregulation and
privatisation of large banks and firms in the second half of the 1980s and early
1990s ended up creating not the dispersed ownership of shares the legislation —
inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model— envisioned, but a government-orchestrated
system of cross-shareholding among large firms.
xii As a result of these failures, the
analyses that end up evaluating how close French industry has come to the
German, US or Japanese model it tried to emulate, end up, almost with exception,
concluding that French industry scores very low. Institutional drag was simply too
strong.5
However, this approach, which compares French companies with its shining
examples, and concludes that France failed to adjust, has its limits. The most
important one, and the critique which is the basis for the analysis which follows, is
the assumption that change is always revolutionary, i.e. dramatic and in a relatively
short time span, and intentional, i.e. as the result of explicitly stated goals. Almost
all analyses of attempted changes in France in the 1980s and 1990s, which end up
concluding that the obstacles to change were simply too strong, consider only the
effects of grand designs for policy changes: for example, the Auroux laws on work
organisation and labour relations, the legislation on administrative decentralisation,
on nationalisations and de-nationalisations, or on the deregulation of the financial
system. The relative failure of these policies then at best (or worst) gave way to a
new hybrid situation, but which usually appeared to reproduce most of the
shortcomings of the old model. The changes that have taken place are, in other
words, usually interpreted not so much in terms of how much changed, but in terms
of how strongly they reflected the old system that was supposed to be changed
through the policies.
Many of those small changes, however, did create new situations. Reorganising the
shopfloor in teams, for example, however limited their responsibilities may be when
compared to the stylised (but also idealised) German or Swedish workplaces, does
allow for new methods of quality control, which translate into productivity increases
xiii
and into new delivery patterns by suppliers, since the causes of quality deficiencies
are more easily retraceable to their roots in a team-based system. What initially
appeared as a failed reform project in industrial relations and skills (the Auroux
laws), thus potentially had major organisational implications.
Sometimes the new opportunities and constraints follow from what are for the
purposes of this paper exogenous changes. Extremely high interest rates in the
early 1980s forced firms in France to shed debt rapidly —a process in large part
financed by the state— and think of ways to reduce their inventory. Large firms thus
began to experiment with just-in-time delivery methods, which they borrowed from
Japan, well before large firms in other countries, which then set in motion
movements toward a reorganisation of the shop floor.
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A proper understanding of industrial change needs to give proper weight to such
small steps and to the unintended consequences of “rational” patterns of
adjustment.
xv The idea at the basis of this is that firms learn —they improve their
understanding of how to make and do the things that are valued in markets.
xvi Yet
learning is very rarely a revolutionary process, involving rapid changes in short
periods of time. Instead, it is an evolutionary process, whereby acquired knowledge
is stored and subsequently becomes the basis for new learning. Firms, like people,
do not learn everything at once: they accumulate small bits of information that, once
integrated (an integration, it should be noted, that does not have to be by design),
allow for different practices in many different and sometimes unexpected areas. In6
firms, the knowledge is stored in the routines and practices adopted to provide
goods and services: the organisation acts as a collective memory.
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This theoretical detour finally has taken us to the empirical body of the paper.
Viewed from the vantage point of the late 1970s, the type of inter-firm relationships
that I am about to describe is no less than revolutionary. Instead of relying on arm-
length contracts with under-financed, technologically backward suppliers, large firms
in France today have extremely tight links with their suppliers: they are involved in
sustained joint quality control and training programs, support SMEs in finance and
technology acquisition, and force them out on international markets instead of giving
them protective shelter. However, none of this was by design. The changes were
the result of  small pragmatic adjustments that were solutions to entirely different
problems than the ones they ended up solving and were made possible by other
small adjustments that had preceded them. Taken individually and at the time of
their introduction, none of these steps were as monumental as they appear
together, today. Instead, the choices made were shaped by and in their own ways
reproduced, the institutional framework the firms were embedded in. Accumulated
over time, however, the small pragmatic steps gave way to revolutionary change.
xviii
The next section, which details the link between large firms and their sub-
contractors, presents empirical material that supports this general theoretical point.
Suppliers are important for two reasons. The first is theoretical: supplier firms
simultaneously provide us with cases of inter-firm patterns that illustrate the limits of
the historical-institutionalist view and are the quintessential category of firms for the
“trust” argument.
Second, suppliers are by all measures important firms. The national statistical
office, the INSEE, distinguishes between manufacturers of intermediate goods
(U04, a proxy for suppliers), equipment goods (U05, a proxy for machine-tools) and
consumer goods (U06). In 1990, the distribution of firms with a size between 50 and
500 employees over these categories was: producers of intermediate goods (U04)
3217 firms (33% of total), equipment goods (U05) 2708 firms (28%), and consumer
goods (U06) 3805 firms (39%). In contrast to other European countries, a larger
proportion of SMEs in France are suppliers: in 1991, 43% of the small firms realised
over one-third of their turn-over as sub-contractors  —the corresponding figures for
the UK and Germany are below 20%.
xix
What follows gives details on three fields that are crucial in the relationship between
large and small firms. The first is the emerging new patterns of sub-contracting,
which require —the second theme discussed— a new organisation of quality control
links between firms. In both these instances, adjustment in large firms determines
the general contours of the changes. The final theme discusses the quid pro quo for
the supplier: support in finance. In all three fields, major institutional constraints
excluded some patterns of adjustment and favoured others; combined, however,7
they demonstrate how these institutional constraints in fact led to new
organisational forms instead of precluding change, as the historical-institutionalist
literature on France suggests. In this new setting, large firms and their suppliers
have become much more strongly integrated than before, but the end result looks
neither like an adapted version of the German or Japanese models. French
industry, it is argued, adjusted along a path which is unique, and which reflects its
own institutional heritage. The links between large and small firms are far from
relations among equals, the state’s guiding --but enabling this time, instead of
leading-- hand is critical in this re-definition of the boundaries between firms, and
the French political-industrial elite is a critical actor in the background. Ironically,
however, all of these continuities are visible only when the changes that have taken
place, are taken seriously.
2. New Subcontracting Relationships
Since at least fifteen years, but really starting after the social upheaval of 1968,
large French firms have massively moved toward subcontracting. In part, this is, as
Berger and Piore’s seminal analysis suggested,
xx related to the labor problem that
large firms face. As a result of their Taylorist organizational heritage, French firms
were, up until very recently, highly vertically integrated corporations, in which minor
disturbances could usually be accomodated with buffers, but where larger ones had
tremendous effects on production. Strikes and other social unrest, not uncommon in
a highly politicized and polarized society such as France, immediately paralyzed
large parts of production that were dependent upon the supply of parts from other
sections in the company. Subcontracting, many large firms learned, was a solution
to this problem.
At least as important as the social control dimension of the turn toward
subcontracting were the costs associated with vertical integration and large buffers.
Being able to physically relocate a large part of production and not having to bear
the carrying charges for it in the shape of capital tied up in stocks during periods of
high interest rates, made a large difference in the comany results. In order to regain
a measure of control over these problems of labor discipline and immediate costs,
therefore, many large firms in France began to increase their subcontracting
arrangements, both in numbers and in terms of intensity of the relationship.
Initially sub-contracting was also really only just that: a relatively inexpensive way
out of a labor problem and tightening economic constraints. Over time, however,8
changes appeared in the nature of the subcontracting relationship itself, which
reflected changes in the relationship between the large and small firms. Individually,
these changes appear as relatively modest ad hoc adjustments; together they
suggest that for both the large firms and the SMEs subcontracting arrangements
have, at least to some extent, redefined the boundaries of the organization.
2.1. Just-in-time delivery systems
French large firms were among the first in the West to turn to just-in-time
delivery systems on a large scale.
xxi In the early 1980s, large firms in France found
themselves caught in a squeeze: government policy, geared at fighting inflation,
forced interest rates up — bank lending rates went from an already high 15.5% in
1977 to almost 21% in 1981, remained above 20% in 1982 and above 17% for at
least three more years—thus making money extremely expensive.
xxii French large
firms were also very dependent on bank credit.
xxiii As late as the early 1980s, French
firms were the most highly indebted of all OECD-countries: the ratio of retained
earnings over bank financing as a source of investment was the lowest in the G5.
xxiv
The firms therefore immediately felt the effects of the anti-inflationary government
policy both before 1981 and after the turn in the socialist government’s economic
policy in 1983. Inventory stored in large rooms is in essence nothing less than a
large amount of tied-up and unused capital. Poor inventory administration thus
became a very expensive management problem and firms realized that inventory
reduction was a necessity in order to reduce financial dependence on banks in the
short run. JIT became the logical solution to this logistical problem.
xxv
Over the last 12 years, large firms in France dramatically reduced their dependence
on finance through the banking system. In 1984, the self-financing ratio (retained
earnings/debt) was below 30%; in 1989,it had increased to almost 54%. And by
1993, the self-financing ratio had increased to the point where debt had become
simply marginal as a means of finance: large firms today finance between 90 and
97% of investment with their own cash flow. 
xxvi
JIT delivery systems survived the firms’ revival of their financial health in the late
1980s and the drop in interest rates in the 1990s, because French firms discovered
the other benefits of JIT delivery such as the discipline it imposes on the production
process resulting from its increasd fragility and transparency. When firms moved
away from finance through banks almost entirely in the first half of the 1990s by
issuing stocks and increasing investment from retained earnings, the JIT systems
remained firmly in place as one of those inadvertent lessons learned as a result of
solving other problems.9
In implementing these new organisational models, however, French firms generally
did not all follow the same patterns. Whereas Renault used the opportunities
offered by JIT delivery systems to revise its relationships with suppliers in what can
generally be described as a more collaborative stance, other French firms followed
a pattern that looked far more familiar from the point of view of the conventional
wisdom. Citroèn, the smaller division of the PSA car group, followed a high-tech,
labor-substitution route in modernising its operation: its final assembly plant in
Rennes hand-picked its suppliers in the 1960s, disciplined them to fit its own
production system, and currently forces them to meet very detailed technical
specifications and a very stringent delivery schedule. Each of the supplier plants -all
within a 50 km radius- has real-time computer links to the central assembly plant,
and they follow the schedule imposed by Citroèn. The company has been able to
establish and exercise such control, because it is, in the low-industrialized Rennes
area, the only large manufacturer.
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2.2. Forced supplier mergers
Large firms in most assembly industries have, in recent years, changed their
expectations towards their suppliers far beyond just-in-time delivery. The reason at
the core of this change is that assembly production can relatively easily be
modulized, i.e. reorganized in such a way that final assembly is merely putting
together a relatively small amount of pre-assembled systems. A typical example
taken from the car industry is the dashboard and heating/cooling system. Under the
old assembly system, the suppliers would bring the gauges for the dashboard, pipes
for the heating and coolling system, the connections between dashboard and frame,
etc; the main job would be done in the final assembly factory itself.  Over the last
ten years, this all changed: assemblers typically have begun to demand from
suppliers that they deliver the pre-assembled dashboards and, if possibly its
connections to the heating/cooling system, which can then relatively easily be linked
to the engine and almost latches onto the frame. All in all, the total final assembly
operation has been reduced tremendously. Something similar happened to chairs,
drive train and gear box, exhaust systems, etc. Assembling a car, in short, has
today become the orchestration of a series of sub-assemblies.
Beside the savings associated with "system assembly“, as a result of the reduction
of direct assembly hours, another, probably far more important source of savings
has emerged for the large firms: the reduction of development costs. It is, in the car
industry for instance, often so that more than one quarter of the total cost
associated with a new model, is incurred before a single car is assembled. Between
one quarter and half of the total cost of a car model is accounted for as
development costs. All the parts have to be designed, functionally related, checked
for interactions, proofed for energy, noise, etc. The new assembly method basically
does away with those costs. Since the suppliers have become "system suppliers,“
they are themselves largely responsible for developing the systems that they10
supply. They are told the functional requirements and dimensions of a "hole“ in the
car body, which they then have to fill without further technical specifications from the
OEM.
Without surprise, for most of the suppliers to the car manufacturers, this has
seriously increased the pressure they face to remain competitive. Even though large
firms in France generally prefer relatively stable supplier relationships, as large firms
elsewhere do, the impediment to truly developing deep-trust relationships is that the
large firms operate in product markets where cost competition prevails. Hence long-
standing trust or relational contracting relationships are hard to forge: cost reduction
remains the primary goal, and suppliers will therefore be traded if they cannot meet
the demands that the large firms impose. In fact, given the bimodal distribution of
firm size in France, with concentrations in both the very large and the very small
firms —a firm like Bosch typically does not exist in France— the system as a whole
appears simply impossible to sustain.
Large French firms have, in order to solve this problem and simultaneously find a
middleground between the advantages associated with long-term subcontracting
relationships and price-based contractual relationships, forced the suppliers to
merge so that they reach a critical size, thus assuring the necessary product
development capabilities that the large firms require. In the car industry, for
example, both the large firms —Renault and PSA—adopted a policy to reduce the
total number of suppliers, turn them into systems suppliers and force them to merge
(under those conditions they may even receive financial and logistical support from
the large firms —see below). The aim is simply to reduce the number of suppliers
with turnover figures below FF 50 Mio (roughly $10Mio in 1993), which would allow
the large firms to retain the benefits of the new supplier methods while dissociating
themselves from the costs of product development. Over the last ten years, for
example, the number of first-tier suppliers of the two large car manufacturers
dropped from 2249 for PSA in 1985 and 1800 for Renault in that year to
respectively 860 and 780 in 1995 (forecast), and the trend for the future is further
downward.
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Large firms have also sought ways to reduce the dependence of the suppliers on
themselves or even on their sector as a whole. The benefits of this move are
twofold. First of all, suppliers survive business cycles and cost crises of single large
companies more easily, while their innovative capacity in product development
increases since they work for different firms at the same time —the idea being that
"if they’re good enough for the competition, they must be good enough for us.“ Most
large firms now try to assure that their suppliers are dependent upon them for only
some 15% of their total turnover; this typically raises the number of the supplier’s
customers to six or seven instead of the usual one or two.
One aspect of these changes usually associated with changing relationships
between large firms and their suppliers, however remains largely untouched in
France: joint product development. Idealtypically, the relation between large and11
small firms tends to be either one based on arms’ length subcontracting (a mode
that is clearly disappearing), or one of systems suppliers. However, in neither of the
two scenarios are suppliers important in the development of new products. The
Twingo, for instance, Renault’s latest car, provides a perfect illustration: even
though it was developed by an interdepartmental project group inside Renault,
according to the best analysis of this process outsiders, i.e. suppliers, were not
involved in the beginning and only began to play a role when the specifications for
the parts were drawn up.
xxix When the suppliers then raised price objections,
Renault made it very clear that it determined the operation, and forced the suppliers
to be inventive enough in order to meet the stringent price and other requirements
that Renault imposed.
Why French car manufacturers did not go this final round after the miles they went
toward integration of their suppliers, is relatively easy to answer. They are
concerned, rightly or wrongly, that as an inevitable consequence of such joint
product development, trade secrets will be exploited by other large firms with whom
they share the supplier but with whom they compete head-on in their domestic and
European markets. Renault and Peugeot, for example, jointly select their suppliers,
but compete furiously in France and Europe. The joint selection procedure itself
lays bare many of the technologies that would be kept more secret in exclusive,
single-sourcing relationships, and in order to avoid the competition benefiting from
this inside information, the firms simply side-step the problem by keeping
development internally while still taking advantage of the economies of scale
generated through joint sourcing.
Large firms thus retain a large amount of control over the process. Instead of
tending toward Moebius strip organizations,
xxx where through the permanent
renegotiation of the product the boundaries between the core firm and the supplier
loses all practical meaning, the large firms keep a tight rein on their suppliers, even
if the relationship itself changes tremendously, since they define —and only they
do!— which product will be made. The reliance on the suppliers does, in all
likelihood, not extend much beyond the quality assurances that the large firms seek
and the insistence on the suppliers to become system suppliers -but within tightly
defined criteria.
JIT is impossible without an increased sense of quality. Parts are delivered when
needed, according to the client’s specifications, and quality control at the point of
delivery, i.e. when the parts finally change hands, is close to impossible. Usually,
firms address this problem by trying to find ways to assess the suppliers quality
potential ex ante.
xxxi This practice, as the next section will show, is crucial in the way
the relationship between large and small firm is structured.12
3. Quality control: Control through quality
As in every other OECD-country in this era of increased international
competition, quality has appeared at the core of industrial organization in France as
well. As such it appears primarily as an expression of increased international
competition: increased openness to international markets forced French firms to
address quality (and productivity) problems much more strongly than the protective
economic regime that supported them during the Golden Age. Yet some specific
elements of the French case suggest that this new orientation to the market is not
the only element at the core of the increased attention to quality, but that quality is
also being used as a instrumental tool which allows large firms to increase their
control over the small firms while retaining the benefits of a co-operative
relationship. The emphasis on quality in the relationship between the large firms
and their suppliers creates a situation where the small firm simply has to accept, in
order for the relation between the two firms to survive in the longer term, that the
large firm collects all the information needed to negotiate from a stronger position
inside its own walls, but does not commit itself to the long-term relationship
envisioned in this exchange of information. The conventional information
assymetries thus simply do not exist.
This section will discuss how quality structures the relationship in different ways:
through the quality audits that large firms organize among their suppliers, through
the ISO norm implementation in France and how this is related to the process of
industrial reorganization more generally, and, third and finally, through the quality
consulting programs that large firms organize for their suppliers. What characterizes
the three mechanisms is that they are simultaneously a response to market
changes and define the relationship between the large and the small firms. The
quality audits are relatively straightforward means of control from the part of the
large firms, since they re-establish what separated the buyer and the supplier all
along, i.e. that the small firm is much more dependent upon the goodwill of the large
firm than vice versa. ISO norms have a similar effect, with the additional benefit, as
I will illustrate, that they are sanctioned, in a subtle and indirect way, by the state.
The quality consulting programs that I discuss, finally, do the same: while securing
quality, they also force the supplier to accept the reorganization measures proposed
by the large firms. All three however, force the supplier tom be open for the intrusive
eyes of the large firms.13
3.1. Quality Audits
The dual nature of the new collaborative relationships is most obvious in what is
known in France as the quality audits. Large firms require from their suppliers that
they meet certain minimum quality standards, especially in just-in-time delivery
situations, where the final producer is simply unable to check every piece
individually. In order to avoid quality problems, furthermore, after-the-fact checking
can be very expensive if errors are found, since large numbers of final products may
already have left the production facility. Finally, given the increased volatility of
markets, specific product-oriented quality control by the final producer does not
assure that the supplier will be able to meet the quality standards in the future. The
buyer, for one thing, does not know which products will be needed in the future, and
it is unclear if being good at one thing implies anything about a totally different
product. Being able to make a particular type of glass today, does not assure that
the supplier will also be able to make the tea cups that the changed market
demands. In essence, only knowledge of how products are made can provide solid
indications of the future capabilities of suppliers, even if that future is extremely
uncertain.
The instrument of choice for the large firms to insure such quality guarantees in the
future is the quality audit, a relatively wide-spread practice among large firms in
France in their relation with SMEs. On regular intervals, the large firms send out a
team of their own experts to examine the supplier’s operations in great detail. The
team examines all the processes that play a role in the production of the part or the
service that the supplier delivers, and that bear on quality, delivery, price or other
relevant aspects. By focusing on aspects of the production process instead of the
spot-checking associated with product quality, the larger firm assures a proper
understanding of the supplier’ capability to follow the technological path that the
large firm takes or may take with its products.
However, and much more importantly, the quality audit is not limited to what is
immediately relevant for the part or service under the supplier’s responsibility.
During the exercise, the team also examines most other components of the firm’s
operations: training and recruitment, balance sheet, finance, links with other SMEs
and larger firms, product development capabilities and market strategies,
technology, etc. In short, the so-called quality audit, as should be apparent from this
short list, is in reality a true audit of the entire company. This information, read
through the eyes of the experienced auditors typically found in these auditing teams
(all have many years of factory as well as headquarters and financial experience,
which also expains why there are only few of them), will allow them to assess the
potential of the supplier for long-term process and product innovation with relative
confidence.
For the large firm, the audit solves three very different larger problems simul-
taneously. First of all, it alleviates the problems associated with the informational14
asymmetries between large and small firms. There should, because of the audit, not
be any relevant information hidden from the large firm. As a result, the large firm
can discuss price, product and other changes with the SME using relatively
complete information. Second, the audit reaffirms the distinct identities of the two
firms. However strongly the links between supplier and buyer may have developed
over time —through joint product development, just-in-time delivery systems,
financial support, and technical exchanges— at the time of the quality audit, the two
firms are very different and may even stand in an antagonistic relationship. Three,
the audit provides guarantees that the supplier has the capablities needed to
remain a viable partner in the future, more or less regardless of the product
strategies that the buyer pursues.
The quality audit thus can be interpreted from two angles. It is undeniably
instrument of control of the large firm over the smaller one. Since the SME has no
choice but to accept the inquisitive demands of the large firm without really being
able to raise objections, limit the extent of the audit or demand a quid pro quo in the
form of a commitment to a contract, the supplier is doubtlessly the weaker party in
the relationship. Yet at the same time, the audit is also a help for the small firm: if
the large firm assesses positively the prospects for future collaboration, the audit is
also a tool that can be used to improve the SME’s operations.
3.2. Quality Certification
For all the gains in information that accrue to the large firm, the audit is an
expensive proactive tool, since every given time period (say every year), the
supplier has to be appraised in order for the large firm to be reassured that the SME
will continue to live up to its expectations. What has happened in recent years,
therefore, is that many French firms adopted the ISO 9000 quality standards and
have drastically decreased their auditing of those firms which are ISO-certified.
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ISO 9000 norms are, in contrast to for example DIN norms or the previous
generations of ISO norms, almost exclusively procedural in character, i.e. they are
based on an assessment of how a product is made, not what it is like, and therefore
meet the requirements of the large firms in France.
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Procedural norms such as ISO 9000 are of increasing importance in today's industry
for two large sets of reasons: the internationalisation of production and the volatility of
markets. As long as suppliers to large firms are primarily selected within the same
country as the buyer, the buyer can take a large number of aspects of production for
granted or is at least able to find out relatively quickly about them: the general level of
technical know-how, quality assurance, shopfloor organisation and skill levels.
xxxiv In
Germany, for example, Mercedes and BMW know the training systems at Bosch,15
the quality control system at AEG, or the level of engineering expertise in Bosch,
AEG or Siemens. They also know how workers' knowledge flows in an organised
fashion into the production process. DIN norms, finally, also round out the pre-
assumptions of the large firms: SMEs that are not DIN-certified can simply not be
trusted to produce quality consistently. Large French firms share a number of pre-
assumptions on the organisation and behavior of suppliers that are a product both
of many years of experience and of projection of their structures onto the smaller
firms. In short, nationally (or, as was before already the case, regionally but within
one national system) organised supplier chains have the advantage for the buyer of
a relatively high level of practical knowledge about how suppliers operate. This
knowledge followed in large measure from an understanding of how relevant
national institutions influence strategic fields such as workers' participation, worker
training systems, links between development engineers and process designers,
etc., and how these influence firm behaviour.
Cost-conscious purchasing departments have, especially since the moves in all
OECD countries toward greater economic integration (true for the EU, NAFTA and
the Yen-block), upset this stability. In their search for lower prices they frequently —
and most accounts agree that this happens more and more often— look across the
borders: in an average car, for instance, usually a small part, sometimes not more
than 10% of the parts is made in the country where final assembly takes place.
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The dense network of freeways in most European countries allows for pieces to be
made in Hamburg and arrive in Munich, Paris or even Milan within one day. In fact,
usually only the absolutely vital parts are located within a very short distance from
the final assembler.
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The internationalization of the production chain implies that large firms cannot rely
anymore on the relatively high floor of practical knowledge about their suppliers that
nationally organised production chains allowed for: further training is, for example,
organized very differently in Germany and France, workers' skills are utilized in a
very different way in England and in Germany, and engineers have different roles in
product development in Sweden, Italy and Spain. Large firms who are unwilling to
forego the savings associated with an internationalized production chain, thus need
a new institution to compensate for the loss of knowledge about their suppliers.
The growing uncertainty of the large firms is aggravated by the increased volatility in
their product markets. Since large firms are unable to predict the detailed nature of
the products they will make tomorrow, the assessment of their suppliers necessarily
cannot rely on how well they are able to produce high-quality parts for the products
the buyer makes today.
Combined, the internationalization of production and increased market volatility thus
make new types of norms a necessity. They are the only way for the large firms to
compensate the loss of practical knowledge about their suppliers and insure
themselves against sudden deficiencies in the suppliers' competence. ISO 900016
provides, for two reasons, such an instrument: the norms are not product-based, as
DIN norms are, but process-oriented, i.e. they register how a product is made: the
quality control, training systems, ..., etc. Moreover, they are the same all over the
world: French ISO 9000 certificates are, in principle, entirely equivalent to Belgian,
British, Greek or German ISO certificates. The ISO system thus indirectly
compensates what firms have lost through the internationalisation of their
production chain.
French firms are especially keen to be ISO-certified. In any international
comparison, French productivity appears as among the highest in the EU, and
because of the relatively low wages, unit labor costs are very low in France.
xxxvii This
makes French products highly competitive in international markets, if product quality
can be assured. Aware of this, the French state has used the economic clout which
results from the ownership of large firms and the organisational savvy vested in the
state bureaucracy to force suppliers to be ready for ISO certification.
The certification itself is left to a private agency, the Association Française pour
l’Assurance de la Qualité (AFAQ), sponsored by the industry federations and the
large firms, and whose goal it is to test, audit and improve the quality system in the
companies. The AFAQ, in turn, sends a team consisting of a certified quality auditor
and a sectoral expert. For both of these, professional knowledge is the basis for
their appraisal: quality norms are very different in a poultry farm than in ceramics or
car parts, and hence the double angle of quality and sectoral knowledge. For their
certification, the firms pay the AFAQ a fee.
One obvious problem that this system faces is how to legitimize such a structure,
which consists solely of private agents, in a country like France with a strong
"public” tradition, without the large firms resorting to brutal force (a move which
would almost certainly be deemed illegitimate by the SMEs and their associations).
The answer lies in part in a quid pro quo for the suppliers: if they accept the
importance of the AFAQ certification, they will be rewarded with orders from the
large firms, and can compete on an even footing with their European competitors.
Even more important, however, is a subterranean transfer of authority from the
state to the AFAQ. As a result of an agreement signed between AFAQ and AFNOR,
the quasi-public agency responsible for the certification of product quality (Agence
Française de Normalisation), all AFAQ quality certificates are also ratified by the
AFNOR. The AFNOR, in other words, and outside the immediate purview of  most
firms, accepts the AFAQ as its partner and extends its publicly sanctioned authority
(it is founded as an agency “declared of public interest”) to the AFAQ. The
legitimacy of the AFAQ is thus reinforced from two sides: the professional
knowledge of the auditing team and the public agency responsible for the
implementation of product quality standards.
As a result of these certifications, many large firms have entirely eliminated their
quality audit for ISO 9000 certified suppliers, as a listing made public by the AFAQ17
in May 1994
xxxviii illustrates. Of the 59 very large firms listed, over half have entirely
eliminated their quality audits, and of the remaining ones, most have done so in
part. With the partial exception of suppliers who provide parts critical to the safety of
the production process, as e.g. in chemicals or the nuclear industry, the elimination
of quality audits seems to be a process taking place across most sectors.
However, and very interestingly, this does not apply to the large state-owned
enterprises. PSA and Renault, for example, who have set up a joint supplier
selection and certification system over the last decades, have only reduced (not
eliminated) the quality audits for the second-tier (and only the second tier) suppliers.
The first tier suppliers remain, as before, subjected to an annual quality review.
Similarly, EDF and GDF, the state-owned electricity and natural gas company, have
retained their system of supplier evaluation, even for certified SMEs. Keeping in
mind the role that the French state has generally played in industrial reorganisation
in France since WW II, one might wonder if the large state-owned firms’ refusal to
drop the audit is simply one way the state tries to keep an eye on the evolution of
quality among suppliers: because it controls so many of the large enterprises, it can
permanently raise average quality standards and thus steer the process.
Yet whatever this implies, AFAQ and other similar certification programs for
suppliers have had major consequences for the relationships between large and
small firms. For many large firms, institutionalized quality certification through
agencies with quasi-public authority such as AFAQ and AFNOR appears as the
midway between the customized labor-intensive firm-organized quality audit and the
selection of suppliers on price and contracts. However, that this does not imply an
unequivocal repeal of the tighter links between large and small firms is illustrated by
a practice which, to some accounts at least, appears to be growing in importance.
The example below is borrowed from Renault, but it is easily applied to most other
assembly industries, since reorganization in most of them takes a similar form as a
result of similar market pressures.
3.3. Quality Consulting
Since a few years, and in large measure related to the draconian cost reduction
programs that Renault initiated after its dramatic financial crisis in 1984, the French
car producer has developed an internal service which provides consultancy to
suppliers, the “service consultant développement fournisseurs.” The main task of
the service
xxxix is to help the medium-sized suppliers, with a turnover between FF 50
million and FF 1000 million, to streamline their operations and push them in “lean
production” (sic). One of the suppliers, for example, was helped by these Renault
consultants to improve its die-changing operations, in order for the company to be18
able to reduce its stocks: the review of the supplier’s production revealed that 30%
of the total value of loans was bound up in the administration of stocks, so the gains
had to be sought there.
The way this consultancy program works in practice is that after a deal has been
concluded between the Renault purchasing department and the supplier, the
Renault consultants take over entirely, without a presence of the purchasing
department. These consultants, two or three at a time for three days or so, then try
to get a general sense of how the supplier is doing, and check most of its operation.
The end result of this diagnostic exercise is a true balance sheet, with strong and
weak points, and a proposal for the supplier about where to take action to
streamline its operations.
The consultants typically propose two types of actions: logistical and investment.
Examples of the first are the stock reduction mentioned above or help in training for
shorter change-over times for dies and moulds. Examples of the second type of
action are new investments to raise the general technological level of the firm or,
more specifically, automate some parts. The key rule for those investments is that
the pay-back period for the investment should be less than one year. After six to
eight months, finally, the consultants draft a long-term progress plan with the
supplier for the next year and a half and beyond. This plan concludes the action of
Renault’s consultants. In the long run, the consultants hope to reduce the
dependance of the suppliers on Renault while raising their general productivity and
thus reduce prices.
Not all companies have such a benign and generally supportive attitude toward their
suppliers. PSA, the other French car manufacturer, for exampler, has adopted a
program that is much harder for the suppliers: its only aim is to reduce prices, its
instrument hard bench-marking techniques, and the supplier is basically left on its
own for changes, without consultants. SOGEDAC, as the PSA department is called,
which deals with improvement in supplier performance, essentially follows the low-
trust pattern conventionally associated with French production models. They send
out a questionnaire about any part of the company they consider relevant:
immediate competition, product strategies and market positioning, industrial
strategy (logistics, investment, product innovation, work organisation, training and
labor relations), and the firm’s financial situation. After the questionnaire is filled out,
a four-person team visits the supplier for three or four days and checks all the
answers. The only goal, as said, is to reduce prices, and the information collected
through the questionnaire is well-suited for that.
Since a few years, Renault and PSA jointly own an agency which selects suppliers
and monitors their quality on a permanent basis. In principle, costs are irrelevant for
the activities of this agency: the agency only deals with supplier quality. However,
even though the initial reason for this is product quality assurance, in the French
industrial landscape, it simultaneously performs a very different function. Through19
this joint selection, the reputation of suppliers is shared knowledge in the network of
large firms, and thus becomes a major sanctioning tool for them. It is as of yet
unclear if this practice is found in other sectors as well —or at least as explicitly as
in the car industry— since it appears that the regular quality audits or the quality
certification does essentially the same. Within the car industry, however, the
reliance of the firms on this method is so great that Renault and PSA figure among
those firms for whom quality certification, even though it is welcomed, has not given
way to abandoning their regular quality audits.
All three of these quality-related organisational innovations tell a similar tale: they
redefine the relationship between the large firm and its suppliers, largely to the
benefit of the large firm. First of all, they solve basic informational problems. Large
firms now have a remarkably clear view of the operations of their suppliers, how
they produce goods with stable quality, their cost structure and how they price them.
The buyers also have a good idea of the technical capabilities of the supplier for
future collaboration. The only way the large firms can do this, without crude
coercion, is by emphasising the necessity of high-quality parts for their more and
more fragile final operations.
4. Financing Suppliers
It is, from the account thus far, rather unclear what suppliers get out of this
redefined relationship. In fact, most of this discussion can, without too much
problems, easily be accommodated within conventional accounts of French
industry. The benefits appear to accrue solely to the large firms who manage to
simultaneously reduce costs and secure quality without sharing decision-making
with their suppliers. The focus on the actual production arrangements, however,
conceals an important element in the relationship that works to the benefit of the
suppliers. It deals with the important role of large firms in financing their suppliers.
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For a variety of reasons, all related to fundamental information assymetries,
financing SMEs is a troublesome affair for all the usual actors involved. First of all,
SMEs are, with few exceptions, in an extremely volatile product market situation, so
volatile that it is almost impossible for banks to be able to assess the risks related to
investment adequately. How would a bank be able to tell how well they are
equipped, in today’s competitive environment, to cope with their ever more
demanding clients? Under a mass production regime, such assessments may be
relatively unproblematic —even though it remains a big feat for banks (or anybody20
else for that matter) to monitor small firms, merely because of sheer numbers— but
in an era of increased competitiveness in the mass market segments and volatile
markets even for big firms, assessing risks becomes close to impossibe (this is very
similar to what drove the large firms in reviewing their quality control procedures).
The universal problem of monitoring small and medium-sized firms takes on a
particular urgency in France where Malthusianism remains the dominant corporate
ideology, even in the 1980s and 1990s.
Since SMEs are very frequently still family enterprises, owners prefer to keep all
information on the operation of their firm from outsiders. The necessary information
to assess the survival chances of the firm is often kept even from the work force,
despite legal provisions for information dissemination to works councils. The
problem is equally pregnant for the banks, who are supposed to extend loans on
the basis of what can only be regarded as very thin information. As a result, SMEs
have, in the past, not been the innovative high-growth firms, a situation which fed
back —negatively— into the relationships with the banks. The result was a vicious
circle of underfinanced SMEs who remained relatively traditional producers, and
were unable to convince the banks to extend loans to them, which in turn blocked
them from developing their innovative capacity.
The practical alternative to bank financing is the stock market. For three reasons,
however, SMEs appear to be very unfavorable candidates for that. The first is the
problem of Malthusianism and concurrent closed-ness of small firms. One could, in
the limit, envision the pater familias/company owner discussing the future of the
company with a banker, even though the fear of the omniscient French state
checking the books as well (through the ownership of banks) will certainly create
some hurdles to the depth of trust in this relationship. But it is almost impossible to
imagine a French family-owned SME to "go public,“ issue shares and be subject to
relatively strict accounting and publication rules. Second, SMEs are usually simply
too small and unstable to be able to issue stock credibly.
xli If banks are unable to
assess risks, how would others be able to do so? Finally, the stock market has up
until very recently basically been entirely marginal in financing French companies —
true for the large firms, but even more so for the small firms.
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Yet small firms do have access to capital, of course, and in recent years financing
sources have not tended to dry up, despite the predicament that appears to make
smooth financing impossible. How, then, is SME financing organised? The answer
is found in the key role that the large firms play in this process. In essence they act
as  the gate-keepers in the system.
The large firms who buy the products or services that the small and medium-sized
firms provide as subcontractors, are the only players in this setup who do not face
the problems associated with the structural information assymetries. First and
foremost, the large firms actually organize a tremendous information flow between
them and their suppliers. Formally, they make regular quality appraisals, either21
directly or through the quality certification, but they in fact know a lot about the
general condition of their suppliers. Because of their new policies, they come as
close as is possible to actually “constructing” their suppliers. It seems, although in
principle they face the same type of informational problem that banks face in
assessing the potential of their suppliers, that because of their power over and
proximity to the SMEs, it is considerably harder for the suppliers to hide information
from the larger firm. A parallel information circuit thus develops, with the large firms
at its center: the large firms thus act as intermediaries in the relation between the
suppliers and their financing sources.
The large firms, first of all, directly support the small firms financially by lending to
them or by assuming large parts of investment costs. Training programs are
organized collectively by large firms and their suppliers; help is provided, under the
guise of quality consulting, to increase the suppliers’ competitiveness (a positive
sum game since the large firms also benefit from that, as we saw above); and SME
investments are written off in part through increased prices (or better: stable prices
when they should drop because of improved productivity).
Frequently, large firms also lend money to SMEs when they take over parts of
production that the larger firms intend to outsource. When the venture turns into a
true spin-off, the large firms forgives the entire loan or a large part of it if the SME
hires (part of) the work force made redundant by the reduced production in the
mother firm.
The large firms are, as a result of their informational advantage, also trusted by the
banks as sources of information on the SMEs. This information flows through the
high-level networks of state, financial, and industrial elites that run the French
economy at the highest level.
A short excursus explains what is meant here. As a result of the frequent moves by
high-powered administrators between state agencies and industry, and given that
business and state elites share an educational and social background in the
Grandes Ecoles, a network exists where a lot of information —about companies
and about people— circulates.
xliii Banks, the third party in the triangle, are therefore
never totally without information about companies, since industrialists also serve in
the Ministry of Finance, on boards of banks, etc. In practice, what happens is that
the frequent moves in and out of industry and the state create a reputational
network, since everyone's track record in these circles is quasi-public. In order to
have a career in this network, which covers state, finance and industry, one has to
retain a good reputation. Given the strategic significance of the network for
individual careers, maintaining a reputation in it is of vital importance: this implies no
bad loan advice or major errors as CEO of large companies.
Using the resources of this network, presidents of large firms provide “informal”
support to the supplier in need of capital by providing the bank with its own22
assessment of the supplier’s capacities; this assessment is looked upon by the
financing bank not so much as an objective evaluation of the SME, but as an
element in this reputational network —it is, in fact, the decent equivalent of
clientelistic patronage: the large firm CEO picking up the phone to call his "buddy“ in
the bank and telling him to lend to the small firm. Since no other direct source of
information is available to the bank, and since the small firm has no alternative to
obtain finance, the system depends crucially on the reputation of the large firm
CEO. Because of the network organization at the highest level of the French
economy, the large firm becomes the bearer of the SME’s reputation and the
safeguard to the entire system.
Finance is therefore the quid pro quo in what appears otherwise as a very
assymetrical relationship between large firms and their suppliers. But, as with all the
other elements in the new relationships between large and small firms, it cuts both
ways: at the same time that it delivers to the supplier in exchange for loyalty, it also
reproduces the fundamental power inequalities between the large and the small
firms. For it is at the time of relying on the large firm’s goodwill to support loan
requests that the small firm sees the benefits of allowing the large firm a lot of
control over its operations in all other respects.
5. Conclusion: Rethinking industrial reorganisation
Large and small firms are not at an arms-length relationship, so much is clear
from this account. In many strategic fields, they are interrelated in ways that go far
beyond the traditional relationship that has characterized most of Western industry
—but especially France. However, as the account presented here suggests,
qualifying the changes as trust does not do justice to their complexity either. In fact,
the much-hailed partenariat of large French firms and their suppliers does exhibit
many of the characteristics that were traditionally associated with the French model
of industrial organization. The suppliers remain, for a variety of reasons, the weaker
party in the set-up and depend for all their vital operations on the goodwill of the
large firms.
At the same time, however, the changed relationship is far enough away from what
the old model presumed it to be in order to raise doubts on its validity. SMEs are
more integrated in the large firms’ operations and the relationship does have one
extremely important benefit for the SMEs: they can make their operations more
profitable and benefit from the entrance of the large firms into financial networks. If
anything, the situation sits uneasily between the old model of the organization of23
French industry and the new models that scholars see appearing all over Western
Europe, the US and Japan, built around coordinated decentralisation.
If the general picture of the relationships between large and small firms that I
presented in this paper is correct, several important consequences for the study of
industrial restructuring follow. Firstly, French industry adjusted to the challenges of
the 1970s and 1980s in its own way, not by emulating other, seemingly more
successful national models. Instead of slowly collapsing under its institutional
baggage, French industry went through a series of changes that allowed it to deal
with the increased international competition —without relying solely on the state.
However, none of these changes were meant to create a fundamentally new
situation. Instead, they were designed to reproduce the existing arrangements. Over
time, and combined, but invisible to most observers, they gave way to a
fundamentally new situation. Much more important than the institutional obstacles to
change, therefore, were the ways in which actors engage —sometimes
unknowingly— institutional resources in a world of increasing uncertainty. Many
small "rational“ steps, frequently designed in an attempt to reproduce the
institutional context within which difficult choices were made, eventually and
ironically led to a new situation. With only a minor sense for overstatement, one
could say that it was the desperate search for stability and continuity in a rapidly
changing world which pushed the system toward the  revolutionary changes that
were documented in this paper.
However, while no "deep logic“ was acting itself out —witness the discussion above
on quality, which detailed three fundamentally different strategies to the same
problem— not everything was possible either. This has to do with the sociology of
knowledge of the actors. First of all, the adjustment to a problem may be "rational,“
but that does not mean that the initial definition of the problem was given. The
definition of a problem itself is a highly political process, whereby interests clash,
new coalitions are formed while old ones are dissolved, and whereby the identity of
the actors can change as a result of these struggles. Reorganising workers in
shopfloor teams, for example, and train them to deal with quality problems in order
to raise productivity, inevitably involves lay-offs of unskilled workers. In the French
car industry, teams could therefore only be introduced after defining the immigrant
workers from former African colonies as obstacles to progress and negotiate plans
for their return with the relevant labor unions (ref.). The definition of the problem as
one of productivity therefore was both a condition for and effect of a definition of
some workers as "problems.“ The counterfactual is helpful here: had the problem
been defined as primarily one of quality, the strategies to deal with the crisis may
have consisted of increased training programs and a devolution of responsibilities to
semi-autonomous teams instead of lay-offs. In Sweden, for example, where by all
accounts industry faced a productivity crisis far more serious than France during the
1980s, the problem was generally regarded as one of quality, and workplaces were
reorganised so that full use could be made of the potential inherent in workers’
skills. With unemployment as low as it was then, and labor unions stronlgy
organised at the national and firm-level, it appeared simply impossible for Swedish24
industrialists to regard their problems as pure cost problems, resolvable through
sweat shop strategies.
What this view suggests is that institutions matter, but not, as in the old view,
primarily because of the objective constraints they impose on a situation; they
matter because of the way they limit, almost mould the possibilities for defining a
problem. Whatever their origins, at some point institutions can acquire a legitimacy
of their own, which makes it impossible to do ignore them, and they begin to impose
themselves as "just ways of looking at a problem."
xliv Institutions thus pre-map, so to
speak, the cognitive world of economic actors. Once such a redefinition has taken
place, “rational” —but bounded— decisions
xlv force the system out of its initial
equilibrium into another one, which may differ only marginally from the previous
one. The same scenario repeats itself again and again, until the system as a whole
is basically unrecognisable. The crux of the matter is that none of these watersheds
were envisioned or perhaps even envisionable from the initial situation; yet they all
bear the marks of the starting point. A lot more is therefore possible than the narrow
interpretations of the role of institutions assume, but the sky is not the limit. Even
the openness which is a part of the initial situation is contextualised, i.e. part of a
system, which may set serious limits on its capacity to adjust.
xlvi
In short, this essay is a call to start rethinking institutional change: if even in an
allegedly “rigid” situation such as the French political economy, dramatic changes
are able to occur, then the categories developed to think about stability and change
themselves may well be incomplete and even wrong. The dominant paradigm of
change in the social sciences today is best captured in the “punctuated equilibrium”
metaphor (see Krasner 1984; Steinmo et al. 1992): large periods of relative
institutional stasis, punctuated by short periods of strife, conflict and fundamental
change. Change, in this model, is exogenous and grand —else it is epi-
phenomenal, replicating the old order. What this essay on French industry suggests
is that a different model of change is equally plausible: one in which actors, by
reflexively adjusting to new situations, but doing so in desperate attempts to retain
the old system, actually call into question the very fundamentals of the system they
are defending. Change in this model is small, endogenous and, most importantly,
unpredictable. Instead of revolutionary changes, the world is governed by small
steps; instead of strong, purposeful actors, the world consists of weak ones, only
just coping; and instead of a clear and sharp sense of interests, these are socially
constructed and extremely malleable. By adopting this alternative view, which
embeds organizational learning in its institutional context, we may finally begin to
"unpack“ the idea of institutions in order to be able to think of how companies and
industries adjust to the instable world since 1973. But in order to do so, we have to
—above all in the case of France— take seriously the changes taking place, instead
of thinking about them as signs of the fundamental impossibility of national political
economies to adjust.25
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